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Coroner’s reportPrevention of future deaths · 2024-0115

“(brief summary of matters of concern) The following matters of concern are directed to…”

Dated 29 Feb 2024, from the coroner for Nottingham City and Nottinghamshire. Sent to 4 organisations or people.

A coroner wrote this report after an inquest, to warn the organisations below about a risk of further deaths.

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Replies were due by 25 Apr 2024.

Organisations that receive a report must reply to the coroner within 56 days, saying what they will do or why they will do nothing. We show whether a response is published on judiciary.uk; a reply may have been sent and not yet published.

  1. Report dated29 Feb 2024
  2. Deadline25 Apr 2024
  3. Published on judiciary.uk6 Mar 2024
  4. Today23 Oct 2026

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The coroner’s concerns

(brief summary of matters of concern) The following matters of concern are directed to NHCT for response - Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 1. A continuing practice/culture of minimising the importance of a ward specific risk assessment and care plan I am concerned that, notwithstanding the existence of a clear, appropriate policy and significant commendable actions by the Trust since Daniel’s death to address this issue, there remain clinical and nursing staff who do not fully recognise or accept the importance of completing and utilising the required risk assessment and care plan. This suggests there may be a persisting training or cultural issue. The inquest heard evidence that there was (and remains) a clear and robust policy in place which most staff were aware of. This requires a care plan and risk assessment be initiated upon a patient’s admission, completed within 72 hours of admission and updated as necessary during admission. Further, since Dan’s death, the Trust has gone to considerable and commendable lengths to ensure that care plans and risks assessments are in place in every case and to reinforce the requirements of this guidance within the Nursing team; that team hold primary (but not sole) responsibility for creating and updating the risk assessment and care plan document. I also heard that a recent audit found that all current patients had an appropriate care plan in place. The Ward Manager agreed this is “a basic and fundamental part” of any patient’s care. In spite of all of this, an experienced ward nurse and two psychiatrists (a consultant and a registrar) involved in Dan’s care seemed to minimise the practical importance of the required process and documentation, the latter both suggesting they would not routinely consult it. 2. Inadequate system of allocating a named nurse to patients and recording the same I am concerned that, notwithstanding the existence of a clear, appropriate policy requiring the same, the current system of allocating a named nurse and ensuring patients receive regular and effective 1:1 sessions with them are inadequate. I am also concerned that no record is kept of the named nurse appointed to each patient, thus (as in this case) hindering any investigation where issue around the role and actions of that person arises. The General Manager of Adult Mental Health at the Trust helpfully and frankly acknowledged that the evidence heard at inquest raised questions about the adequacy of the existing system, of which he was not previously aware of. It remains unclear whether Daniel was appointed a Named Nurse who failed to perform that role effectively, or whether there was a failure to appoint such a nurse at all. The General Manager’s view was that under the existing system, it is possible that a named nurse was appointed without their knowledge. While the Ward Manager gave evidence that she would have no confidence Daniel would have known who his named nurse was, even if one was appointed. The inquest heard evidence that named nurse sessions with Daniel during previous admissions had been important opportunities for engagement with staff and had elicited a substantial amount of information pertinent to his risk and treatment. The General Manager assured me that he has already requested an urgent review of the system, but he was unable to provide any further information upon conclusion of the inquest as to what further action, if any, is proposed. 3. Inadequate skills/knowledge/training on how to encourage patients to engage I am concerned that clinical, nursing and/or support staff may not currently have sufficient skills or knowledge in dealing with patients who appear unable or unwilling to engage with staff and/or treatment. A psychiatrist not involved in Dan’s care gave evidence about the advice he would have given to colleagues on how to seek to assist a patient who, like Dan, was unwilling or unable to engage with staff: first, identify the likely reasons for the patient’s lack of engagement; second, having regard to those reasons, develop plans and strategies to address the specific barriers identified. Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 I heard little evidence that either of these steps was followed by any of the staff involved in Dan’s care. One barrier was identified (his previous negative experiences on the ward and wish to be transferred to another ward or hospital) but seemingly forgotten after an initial transfer request to the Bed Management team, which was not then followed up. Even with the benefit of hindsight, the doctors, nurses and healthcare assistants involved in Dan’s care seemed unable to offer any insight into the reasons for his difficulties engaging beyond his diagnosis of EUPD or articulate any strategies or techniques that might have helped him overcome them. The following matters of concern are addressed to Secretary of State for Health and Social Care & NHS England 1. I am concerned that confirmed ingestion of during a 999 call / does not trigger a category 1 response from the Ambulance Service Dan ingested at around 20:30 on 22 April 2022. His friend informed the 999 call handler that he had done so during a first 999 call at 20:39. That call was correctly graded as requiring a category 2 response, as Dan was both conscious and awake. 14 minutes later, at 20:53, Dan collapsed. His friend’s second 999 call was correctly graded as requiring a category 1 response, as Dan had become unconscious, his breathing agonal. The first ambulance crew arrived at 21:04. Dan went into cardiac arrest at approximately 21:24. Consideration was given by the ambulance crew to ‘scoop and run’ to arrange a rendezvous to administer the necessary “drugs to counter ”, but this was no considered longer feasible once Dan had gone into cardiac arrest. The inquest heard evidence from a consultant toxicologist that even in very small quantities (or ) i

An extract. Read the full report, including the circumstances of the death, on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website.

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judiciary.uk, Prevention of Future Deaths reports, 2024-0115
Added to Minute Book
8 Oct 2026
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Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, judiciary.uk. Open Government Licence v3.0

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