“In the course of the inquest, I found the following facts to have been established: 1) Mr”

The coroner’s concerns

– In the course of the inquest, I found the following facts to have been established: 1) Mr. Hines had been admitted to the Alexandra Hospital on 26.5.23, where he was treated for a ruptured Baker’s cyst; 2) On 19.6.23 Mr. Hines was moved to side room 2, on ward 2 at the hospital. This room had been vacated that same day by another patient who had had a 1 known MRSA infection and an exfoliating skin condition which, taken together, represented a heightened risk of a subsequent occupant of the room developing an MRSA infection, and therefore ought to have triggered a Red ( hydrogen peroxide ) clean of the room before Mr. Hines moved into it; 3) A Red clean of the room did not take place before Mr. Hines moved into the room – instead, an Amber ( chlorine ) clean was carried out in error; 4) The Trust’s investigation into the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hines’ death was unable to establish why no Red clean was ordered, or why an Amber clean had been mistakenly ordered instead; 5) On or about 24.6.23, because Mr. Hines had now been an inpatient for 28 days, he should have been screened for MRSA. That routine MRSA screen was not carried out. The Trust’s investigation was unable to explain why that routine screen had not been carried out; 6) On 26.6.23 Mr. Hines suffered an accidental fall in the room, and was found to have sustained a fractured right neck of femur. As a result, he was transferred to Worcestershire Royal Hospital where surgery to fix the neck of femur fracture was carried out on 1.7.23; 7) As a matter of established routine, Mr. Hines should again have been screened for MRSA prior to his surgery,. Once again, that routine MRSA screen was not carried out. The Trust’s investigation did not explore the question of why that routine MRSA screen had not taken place; 8) Mr. Hines was eventually screened for MRSA on 3.7.23 ( after his surgery ), and a couple of days later the results of that screen confirmed that he had tested positive for MRSA. He was started on decolonisation treatment on 6.7.23; 9) A few days after his surgery, Mr. Hines developed an infection around his surgical wound, and sepsis. He was returned to theatre on 12.7.23 for debridement and washout of the surgical wound. Analysis of swabs from the wound and blood cultures, both taken during this procedure, showed the presence of MRSA, and that the MRSA matched that of the previous occupant of his side room at the Alexandra Hospital; 10) Despite treatment, Mr. Hines died at Worcestershire Royal Hospital on 15.7.23. The cause of death was: 1a sepsis; 1b infected surgical wound ( methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus ); 2 heart failure and chronic kidney disease; 11) Had side room 2 on ward 2 at the Alexandra Hospital received the required Red clean before Mr. Hines moved into it, he would probably not have developed the MRSA infection, and would probably not have died when he did. Although I was unable to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that identification of the MRSA infection at either the missed routine 28 day screen on or about 24.6.23, or at the missed pre-surgery screen on 1.7.23, would have resulted in treatment which would likely have prevented Mr. Hines’ death, it is a matter of grave concern that these screens and the Red clean of the room, all routine measures designed to identify, treat and prevent the spread of such a serious pathogen, were not carried out. These failures have led me to conclude that staff at both the Alexandra Hospital, Redditch, and Worcestershire Royal Hospital, do not have sufficient awareness of the Trust’s policies and procedures which require such measures to be taken.

An extract. Read the full report, including the circumstances of the death, on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website.

Source

judiciary.uk, Prevention of Future Deaths reports, 2024-0013

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8 Oct 2026

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Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, judiciary.uk. Open Government Licence v3.0