“I heard evidence that Mr Wells GP wrote two urgent letters to the RSFT consultant…”
Dated 5 Sep 2022, from the coroner for West Sussex. Sent to 3 organisations or people.
A coroner wrote this report after an inquest, to warn the organisations below about a risk of further deaths.
The 56-day response deadline
Deadline passedReplies were due by 31 Oct 2022. A reply may have been sent and not yet published.
Organisations that receive a report must reply to the coroner within 56 days, saying what they will do or why they will do nothing. We show whether a response is published on judiciary.uk.
- Report dated5 Sep 2022
- Deadline31 Oct 2022
- Published on judiciary.uk4 Oct 2022
- Today23 Oct 2026
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Responses from each recipient
| Sent to | Response |
|---|---|
| NHS England | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in October 2022. |
| Royal Surrey County Hospital NHS Foundation Trust | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in October 2022. |
| Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust | Deadline passedNo response published on judiciary.uk so far. The 56-day deadline was 31 Oct 2022. A reply may have been sent and not yet published. |
The coroner’s concerns
a) I heard evidence that Mr Wells GP wrote two urgent letters to the RSFT consultant oncologist and HPB surgeon dated 22 September 2021 raising concerns that the patient had heard nothing further after the liver surgery in September 2020. These letters were sent to the East Surrey hospital by the GP. I heard evidence that both consultants hold clinics in two East Surrey hospitals as well as within their own Trust area. Principally the letters were about lack of treatment for a cancer patient and I heard evidence during the inquest that the RSFT witness assisting the court on governance & risk issues did not know the doctors had received the letters and presumably were not logged on the Datix system thereby raising concerns regarding: i. whether additional guidance may be appropriate for GPs to know where to raise concerns about patient treatment in hospital or tertiary care; and ii. whether further guidance or refresher training is needed for hospital doctors regarding use of the relevant Datix system. Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 b) I also heard evidence from SASH that they would not have expected Mr Wells to be transferred back to them after the liver surgery as further chemotherapy was needed. Conversely, RSFT were unable to explain why Mr Wells did not remain on the Somerset Cancer Registry (SCR) tracking system following discharge and the MDT discussion on 10 August 2020. I was told that the safety net to avoid a cancer patient such as Mr Wells failing to receive further treatment is an inter-provider transfer (IPT) to ensure the responsibility for care is formally transferred. In this case, a local process of consultant-to- consultant referrals, in other words a workaround, had evolved and both the hardcopy letter between doctors and an email from the CNS to two separate doctor’s secretaries had failed resulting in no further appointment been made. It was accepted that the communication failure was not identified in a timely manner and that communication systems between both Trusts had blurred with the suggestion that these could be clarified by a renegotiation of the Service Level Agreement (SLA). I was provided with a copy of the current SLA dated 1 January 2015 and note that the particulars state the contract term was 36 months with an end date of 31 December 2017. Given the importance of good systems of communication between Trusts and the IPT system I remain concerned about: c) 6 i. the lack of progress made in reviewing/renegotiating the SLA bearing in mind the difficulties in this case were drawn to the attention of the Trusts in September 2021. ii. an ongoing firewall problem between the two Trusts as this places a current reliance on email rather than automatic electronic systems especially given the failure of emails in this case to secure a much-needed appointment. I heard evidence that Mr Wells was told his key contact in SASH was a named Clinical Nurse Specialist. When his care transferred to RSFT, witnesses expected his key contact to be changed to a CNS based within the St Luke’s Cancer Centre in Guildford. During the inquest I asked who the CNS was at RSFT and following enquiries learned that the St Luke’s staff believed the key contact was the SASH CNS. I remain concerned that there is insufficient clarity for both patients and staff when there is an IPT from SASH to RSFT and vice versa.
An extract. Read the full report, including the circumstances of the death, on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website.
- Source
- judiciary.uk, Prevention of Future Deaths reports, 2022-0274
- Added to Minute Book
- 8 Oct 2026
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Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, judiciary.uk. Open Government Licence v3.0
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