“During the course of the inquest I heard that as a result of the Patient Safety Incident…”
Dated 23 Apr 2026, from the coroner for Birmingham and Solihull. Sent to 1 organisation or person.
A coroner wrote this report after an inquest, to warn the organisations below about a risk of further deaths.
The 56-day response deadline
All responses publishedReplies were due by 18 Jun 2026.
Organisations that receive a report must reply to the coroner within 56 days, saying what they will do or why they will do nothing. We show whether a response is published on judiciary.uk; a reply may have been sent and not yet published.
- Report dated23 Apr 2026
- Deadline18 Jun 2026
- Published on judiciary.uk18 Jun 2026
- Today21 Oct 2026
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Responses from each recipient
| Sent to | Response |
|---|---|
| University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in June 2026. |
The coroner’s concerns
– 1. During the course of the inquest I heard that as a result of the Patient Safety Incident Investigation (“PSII”) into Stephanie’s death which concluded in May 2025 a safety action was recommended and accepted by the Trust which was aimed at promoting a clear Multidisciplinary Team approach and care pathway for patients with acute pancreatitis. The target date for implementation of this action was the 30th August 2025. 5 2. The agreed safety action was, in summary, that a meeting was to be conducted between all UHB hospital sites to discuss and confirm a pathway for patients with complex pancreatitis and to include agreement on (i) the threshold for referring patients between sites (e.g. from Good Hope Hospital to Heartlands Hospital or Queen Elizabeth Hospital which is the regional hepatobiliary specialist centre) including timescales (ii) confirmation on how referrals, treatment pathways and outcomes (including MDT outcomes) are documented on each site and processes for ensuring these are visible between sites and (iii) the processes for shared care between hospital sites and services. 3. However, I heard evidence from one of the Trust’s clinical delivery group medical directors that, as at the date of the inquest, whilst meetings had taken place between the specialisms at the different hospital sites regarding the proposed care pathway/MDT arrangements and a draft document setting these out had been discussed, this is still to be finalised and shared with all relevant staff. 4. In this case, I was satisfied that the absence of an effective MDT approach to the management of Stephanie’s condition had a more than minimal contribution to her death. I am therefore concerned that there remains a risk of future deaths until such time as there is an agreed, documented care pathway for patients with complex acute pancreatitis that is accessible to and understood by clinicians across the different UHB hospital sites.
An extract. Read the full report, including the circumstances of the death, on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website.
- Source
- judiciary.uk, Prevention of Future Deaths reports, 2026-0224
- Added to Minute Book
- 8 Oct 2026
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Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, judiciary.uk. Open Government Licence v3.0
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