“In respect of preventing concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs and…”
Dated 14 Oct 2025, from the coroner for Inner South London. Sent to 5 organisations or people.
A coroner wrote this report after an inquest, to warn the organisations below about a risk of further deaths.
The 56-day response deadline
Report put online after its 56 daysOrganisations that receive a report must reply to the coroner within 56 days, saying what they will do or why they will do nothing. We show whether a response is published on judiciary.uk; a reply may have been sent and not yet published.
judiciary.uk put this report online on 19 Dec 2025, after the 56 days for replies had ended (9 Dec 2025). These dates can’t tell us whether a reply was due before it went online. A reply may have been sent and not yet published.
- Report dated14 Oct 2025
- Deadline9 Dec 2025
- Published on judiciary.uk19 Dec 2025
- Today23 Oct 2026
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Responses from each recipient
| Sent to | Response |
|---|---|
| Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in December 2025. |
| NHS England | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in December 2025. |
| Oracle and Cerner | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in December 2025. |
| Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory AgencyNamed in the report as “Medicine and Healthcare Product Regulatory Agency” | Response publishedPublished on judiciary.uk in December 2025. |
| Royal College of Physicians | Response published, not yet matchedA response is published with this report. We haven’t yet matched it to the organisation it’s from, so it may be this one’s. |
The coroner’s concerns
– 1. In respect of preventing concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs and otherwise preventing prescribing errors resulting in therapeutic excess of paracetamol (NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA, LGT) (1) NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA I consider that the risk of concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs is of wider national concern. The Cerner prescribing system offers a duplicate checking functionality 2 that is not a standard feature. It is hard stop and can be overridden and was not adopted by the LGT when the system was introduced. All the healthcare professionals were aware that co-codamol contained paracetamol and should not be prescribed with paracetamol. However, the 2 prescribing doctors failed to recognise that Mrs Hughes was already prescribed a paracetamol containing drug. 2 nurses failed to recognise they were administering 2 paracetamol containing drugs. A pharmacist failed to identify the concurrent prescriptions during reconciliation. (2) LGT LGT’s response to the incident was swift and commendable. A hard stop was introduced to the electronic prescribing system which eliminated concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs. Further refinements of the system significantly reduced therapeutic excesses of paracetamol based on weight, which had been identified as an issue when investigating Mrs Hughes’ death. However, it is my understanding that consideration is being given to changing the electronic record and prescribing system. My concern is that during any move to a new system, the safety nets introduced by the Trust will be diluted or lost 2. Management of therapeutic excess if it has not been prevented (LGT) This issue has arisen from the finding that once the concurrent prescription had been identified, there had no attempt to consider whether there had been a therapeutic excess and whether Mrs Hughes had suffered harm. The Trust’s response to the incident focused on prevention. It did not consider the adequacy of the clinical response once the overdose had been identified. The Trust relies on information sharing of learning from incidents and thereafter places reliance on individual clinical practice. I received no evidence of a robust process for ensuring a consistent clinical response to the management of therapeutic excess and the potential for toxicity. 3. The assessment of the ACVPU score (LGT, RCP, NHSE) This concern has arisen out of the fact that Mrs Hughes was scored as alert when she was confused. Confusion would have added a score of 3 to her NEWS2 score and would have resulted in an earlier escalation of her condition. I heard that confusion is not always easy to identify and that the signs can be subtle. (1) LGT The Trust provided training materials relating to detection and management of deteriorating patients. There was minimal guidance on how to accurately assess the ACVPU score and the confusion element in particular. There remains a tangible risk that the ACVPU score will continue to be 3 assessed inconsistently, with new episodes of confusion continuing to be missed. (2) NHSE, RCP I consider that consistent and accurate assessment of the ACVPU element of the NEWS2 score is likely to a matter of wider concern. This concern is being brought to the attention of NHSE and the RCP as I consider that they have the power to support healthcare professionals to ensure consistent and accurate scoring of confusion. 4. Mechanism for recording over the counter medications taken prior to attendance at the Emergency Department (LGT) This concern has arisen out of my finding that Mrs Hughes had taken an over the counter (OTC) drug containing paracetamol before her admission to hospital but that this had not been recorded as part of her medication history. The Trust’s Medicines Reconciliation Policy requires that patients should be asked about OTCs. The Trust relies on individual clinical practice. There is no mechanism to ensure that pre-admission OTCs are consistently recorded such that the risk of therapeutic excess of paracetamol (or other drugs available OTC) in those circumstances continues to exist. 5. Trust approach to mitigating against confirmation bias and encouraging professional curiosity (LGT) Confirmation bias and a lack of professional curiosity were significant features in Mrs Hughes’ being administered two paracetamol containing drugs at the same time and in not investigating whether she had received a therapeutic excess and suffered consequential harm. I have found that the Trust does not have robust mechanism for mitigating against confirmation bias and encouraging professional curiosity. 6. Trust policy on managing virtual patient reviews (LGT) This concern has arisen out of the fact that Mrs Hughes had been reviewed virtually rather than face to face a resident doctor on the morning before she became unwell. The Trust has no guidance or policy on virtual reviews. I was told that this is a matter of clinical judgment. The absence of any guidance to help a still relatively inexperienced resident doctor decide when they can dispense with a face-to-face review is a circumstance that creates a risk that future deaths may occur.
An extract. Read the full report, including the circumstances of the death, on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website.
- Source
- judiciary.uk, Prevention of Future Deaths reports, 2025-0511
- Added to Minute Book
- 8 Oct 2026
- Reuse
- We show short extracts and link to the original. We don’t host the full report.
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Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, judiciary.uk. Open Government Licence v3.0
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